HUMAN NEEDS AS THE FOCUS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES *

by

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1. Introduction.

A Convergence towards Human Needs

There are many ways of depicting the development of
the social sciences, and one   may be as an optic lens.
It started at one point, usually referred to as "philosophy";
then came a long process which has lasted for two hundred
years or so of fragmentation, divergence into a spectrum of
social sciences, eventually with very many spectral lines and
one tiny speciality build around each one - and then, now,
there seem to be some signs of convergence again.

Why this process, what is its significance?

The fragmentation into specific social sciences no   doubt
has something to do with the triple emergence of three pheno-
mena from the early 17th century towards our days: the rise
of bureaucracy and the nation-state, the rise of large-scale
capitalism,and the rise of intellectuals as a class, with
increasing monopoly over the means of intellectual production.
Increasingly large areas could be controlled with increasing
depth from a center which, accordingly, became a control plat-
form, staffed with bureaucrats, capitalists and intellectual
professionals of various kinds. Why the latter? because the
system became too complicated for the more practical executors
of power to handle - there was a need to collect data, to
process and analyse them and interpret them, there was a need
for the skill of the intellectual professional. Specialists
in law and politologists came to complement the activities of
the bureaucrats, economists interpreted and aided the capitalists,
and researchers developed their own mushrooming system with
disciplines and sub-disciplines, in an increasingly complicated
system. The system grew larger and larger into several states,
regional unions etc. and ultimately into transnational corpo-
rations, and the intellectuals followed suit, sometimes lying
behind, sometimes leading the race towards forms of understanding
that made it possible to administer and control,according to uni-

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* Professor K. William Kapp in memoriam.

versal rules, bigger and bigger units. Thus, as an example:
as the Western powers developed colonial empires, forms of under-
standing of the "natives" had to be developed, equipping them
with characteristics somewhere between man and animal (their socie-
ties were human, but not "historic"): the rise of social anthro-
pology as a disciplin.

The net result of this process of specialization and
proliferation is clearly seen today. From older days there were
the two basic approaches to understanding of the human condition,
in time and in space: history and geography. But they have been
themselves objects of sub-division, and a complete spectrum has
arisen to come to grips with the human condition, from the micro-
sciences dealing with individuals (psychology) to the macro-sciences
dealing with the world as a whole (international relations), with
a variety of social sciences dealing with intermediate systems
(economics, politology, sociology, social anthropology, etc.).
Each of these siences developed its own paradigm, its own set of
variables and patterns of explanation, and quickly became mutually
exclusive although certainly not exhaustive. Each disciplin became
a closed system with specialists less inclined to learn and borrow
from each other, and with increasingly closed paradigms, particularly
where classical mechanics was imitated and mathematics was brought
in to help build impressively deductive, but also increasingly
sterile, axiomatic systems.

Then the negative aspects of this development became
more apparent. One was obvious: each specialist had to train,
but also detrain - systematically delearn intuitive or educated
insights that were outside the paradigm of his speciality.
A sociologist might have the suspicion that a phenomenon had
economic roots, yet would be told at his professional meetings
that he should look for a "sociologically explanation". Theories
became more and more complicated, and ultimately so specialized
that they could only be understood by colleagues; the public in
general did not recognize themselves in these one-sided insights
into human relations - no doubt intellectually brilliant, but
unrealistic because human beings simply are not homo psychologicus,
homo sociologicus, homo economicus or homo politicus. Unfortu-
nately, however, this division was also reflected in the division
of executive power into ministries/departments, and ultimaterly
into the UN specialized Agencies.

The job done might be satisfactory to the specialist but not to the people it was supposed to concern, to be about.

Second, when there were problems such as how to obtain more peace, how to get at development, how to cope with the future, it very soon became apparent that the fragmentation of the social sciences also had led to a fragmentation of the social scientists in the interests of power-holders. The social scientists were divided and easily conquered, and became the tools of the power-holders, with the latter retaining one important key to superiority: he did not have to respect paradigms, he could be permitted to integrate, to put together or to impose his own vision, often 'very superior to the distorted, one-sided views held by the intellectual specialists. The latter were kept in separate cages, fed regularly with stipends and salaries in order to produce their one-sided results from which the establishment could pick what it wanted, i.e. that which caused least disturbance, yet could give the appearance of being rational ., scientific and serve as a basis for putting some of the blame on the social scientists. The latter engaged in competitive games trying to get more respect for their particular paradigms in the corridors of power.

As a result of all this the idea of interdisciplinary research was born. It was an effort to put knowledge together in such a way that more complete images of homo sapiens could emerge in his social setting, local, domestic, global, and also to build more solidarity among social scientists. It very soon became evident, both in peace studies, development studies and future studies that it was not simply a question of adding up the one-sidedness of the paradigms of participating social scientists. New, very broad and flexible paradigms had to be developed - the step from interdisciplinary to trans- or meta-disciplinary studies. To indicate a, somewhat looser, more reflecting, perhaps philosophical approach, the term "studies" was increasingly preferred to the term "research".

But how did they work the people who became the protagonists and the hard workers to till the fields of peace, development and future studies (and there are other examples of such inter/transdisciplinary ventures)? It very soon became apparent how

limited their range   of inquiry was, and how much it was
inspired, even taken directly from, one particular paradigm.

In peace studies the point of departure was the inter-
disciplinary study of how to avoid war, defined as organized
violence between collectivities of which at least one is orga-
nized as a state. Violence was the evil to be eradicated or
at least managed, it was seen in very conventional terms as
"shots fired in anger". Thus, peace studies became essentially
a problem of how other social scientists could come to the
assistance in the study of international relations.

In development studies the problem was clearly economistic:
development was narrowed down to "economic growth", economic
growth was then narrowed further down to increases in the
gross national product per capita which, then, is an other way
of saying that the country should industrialize and market
its products domestically and abroad if development is to take
place - in other words that the country should do what the
western, industrialized, capitalist countries had already done.
There were obstacles: social structures incompatible with this
were referred to as "traditional", any attitude against was
defined as "resistance",and sociologists, social anthropologists
and psychologists were called in to try to come to grips with
such impediments.

In future studies another problem was attached: how to
cope wit affluence. The rich countries became richer, the
rich people in the rich countries became more numerous: What
were they going to do, how should they fill their lives in a
meaningful way, what would the problems of these societies be?
In future studies the paradigm was **flexible** , probably the
field was much more open to literary people and other artists,
to architects and even to citizens in general, not yet detrained
in the way social scientists were. As a result the field remained
more open, less "scientific" and was, consequently, not taken
as seriously as the other two.

It did not take much time before the transcendence of
this modest inter/transdisciplinary transcendence of social
science fragmentation started. Broader conceptualizations of

"peace" and "development" emerged. More particularly, questions were asked of why peace research would only be concerned with the direct violence that kills quickly and not also with the structural violence that kills slowly; further, why it should only be concerned with violence that kills and not violence that represses and alienates; and still further why it should only be concerned with the relations between states or between a state and an opposing group, why not with relations in society in general? But this type of questioning quickly led to other concepts of peace (incidentally, much less dominated by the Roman Pax , more by Middle East and oriental concepts of peace, more in the sense of harmony, justice) and peace as human self-realization emerged.

Similarly, in development studies the economistic approach quickly became a target of criticism, particularly in its "catching up" variety. The idea of catching up with the rich countries was questioned, first in terms of whether it was at all possible, secondly in terms of whether it really was desirable? The "developing" countries started having a fresh look at the "developed" countries, very well aided by the dissidents and critics inside these countries and found them increasingly wanting. The idea of "under"-developed vs."over"-developed countries emerged, both of them mal-developed one way or the other, and development was increasingly seen in terms of developing human beings, rather than developing countries - the latter was seen as a means, not as an end.

In future studies the fascination with gadgets and technology of various kinds abated, and the quest for deeper understanding of what one should demand of the future arose. The notion of the world as relatively interdependent, strongly coupled became prominent. In development studies that would lead to the idea of synchronic solidarity: my development should be in solidarity with others in other parts of the world whose development by efforts to develop should not impede but facilitate. In short, there was a search which is still going on for cooperative, mutually reinforcing patterns of development

rather than for competitive developmental strategies.
And correspondingly in future studies: the idea of diachronic
solidarity with future generations emerged as the environ-
mental constraints on the human condition became more and more
apparent. The West had developed through colonization in space,
it should not be permitted also to colonize the future!

Throughout all this there is one general line or point
of convergence: peace, development and the future are all
increasingly seen in terms of human self-realization, develop-
ment of human beings everywhere,and also in the future. In other
words, these inter/transdisciplinary efforts have become
increasingly human being-centered. Moreover, answers have
started emerging to the questions of what the meaning of self-
realization, development of human beings etc. are: satis-
faction and further development of human needs. But here we
should proceed with a certain care. Clearly, "peace" and
"development" are value-loaded terms and they should be:
they refer to "problems", viz., the simple problem that there
is not enough of peace and development almost regardless of
how it is defined. And the term "future" is almost equally
value-loaded: it is not merely a segment in time, it is the
projection screen for all our hopes, for instance in the fields
of peace and development.

So let us try to trace a transition from the broad terms
such as "development" and "peace" to conceptualizations in terms
of human needs, in order to see (1) to what extent this can
serve as a basis for peace, development, and future studies,
and (2) to what extent it serves as a convergence point.

2. From values to needs.

Our task now is to build some conceptual bridges between general value terms and human needs. This human focus is necessary because one can so easily imagine, and recent history abounds with examples, of parts of the world that have benefitted from high levels of both "peace" and "development" in some senses of the terms, yet exhibiting very high levels of degradation of human beings in all senses of that word. On the other hand, human enhancement can be at a very high level also when economic growth in that particular sense is low, even zero - as can be seen in communities practising local self-reliance in the sense of producing for their own food, clothes, shelter, health and education, but with little or no processing and/or marketing. Absence of peace, however, affects human enhancement directly, of that there is no doubt.

The question then becomes how we get nearer to human beings in an effort to lay down basic values - and the link here is provided by the concept of "need". The concept is problematic, and can easily lead us into the same type of scholasticism as the theory of instincts some generations of psychologists ago: whenever one encounters something not accounted for otherwise it is referred to as a "need". Consequently, some criteria have to be laid down to indicate the conditions under which we shall refer to something as a "need". These criteria should be reasonably empirical in the sense that there should be something (intersubjectively perceived and communicated) one can point to, saying: "look, this means that some need was/was not satisfied". On the other hand, the criterion should also be reasonably universal, meaning relatively independent of time and space; enabling us to use the criterion to formulate something about human needs, not only the needs of a special group in a special time-space niche. In saying so one would of course agree immediately that the level of need-satisfaction held to constitute a minimum would vary with time and space,as seen clearly even in the simple examples of food intake, or health. There is hardly any universal key to the quantitative aspect of need-satisfaction. But there may be a high degree of universality to the qualitative aspect, meaning the need dimensions, or, at least, one should aim at a list of that kind.

If this is so we should only hope for a criterion that is negative, indicating that needs are not satisfied (or satisfied below minimum, which is another way of saying the same). If the threshold of satisfaction varies in time and space, and in an unknown manner, then we would not know whether the absence of a positive criterion means that the dimension is not a need-dimension, or that the threshold has not yet been reached, whereas the presence of a negative criterion is a clear indication that some need is not satisfied.

One such negative criterion is the idea of disintegration. This is a strong term, indicating that something no longer functions. It is more than mere frustration, which can be defined as the reaction when goals are not attained - but frustrated people usually function, often even better than the non-frustrated ones. Consequently, the idea of disintegration should be linked to goals that are so deeply embedded in the psychosomatic structure of human beings that they can be referred to not only as needs, but as basic needs.

To try to save this from becoming an exercise in "obscurium per obscurius" the concept of "disintegration" now has to be specified. One way of doing that might be as follows:

Table 1:
Types of disintegration

	Absolute	Partial
Individual level	death	somatic disease mental disease
Social level	revolt	apathy anomie

The ultimate disintegration of the individual is through death; of the society through revolution. Then there are more partial forms: various types of disease, various types of withdrawal from reasonable levels of activity, participation. No particular image of a perfect society is needed to see these as negative criteria, although the top row (and even then only for some forms of mental

disease) is considerably more clear than the bottom row. And there are cultural variations: how would one deal, for instance, with the Chinese concept of a "cultural revolution" as something that is the sign of the health of a society, not of disintegration? Possible answer: by seeing it as an indication that there _is_ a need for transcendence into a new social order because the old one fails to satisfy some human needs - and that the Chinese are wise enough to make use of the only form of disintegration that can be productive, yet saving human lives (we are then thinking of the cultural revolution as basically a non-violent form of revolution).

If these are the types of disintegration, what, then, are the corresponding needs and what are the names, in common parlance, for the problems associated with the non-satisfaction of these needs? The following is one suggestion - but here it should be remembered that although this is also a fourfold table there is not necessarily a one-to-one correspondence between this one and the preceding table. Apathy may be the response to repression, not only to alienation; violence certainly results in wounded, not only dead people; some types of mental disintegration may be the outcome of poverty, repression and alienation, and so on. But, as a rule of thumb a comparison between the two tables may nevertheless be suggestive (antonyms in parentheses):

Table 2:
Types of basic needs and basic problems

	Impediments for satisfaction	
	direct (intended)	structural (built-in)
Material needs (somatic)	SECURITY (violence)	WELFARE (Poverty)
Non-material needs (mental)	FREEDOM (Repression)	IDENTITY (Alienation)

Again, the headings for the rows and columns should not be taken too seriously; they also serve to indicate rather than to define.

This, then, serves to indicate four clusters of needs, and time has now come to try to spell them out in more detail. The following is one

suggestion (see Table 3, next page). Some explanatory words may be appropriate about this list.

First, it will be noticed that the list is divided into the same four groups as in the Table above. The specific needs **are** meant as examples, and the list is certainly neither exhaustive, nor are the categories mutually exclusive. More important than such methodological criteria, however, are some of the substantive issues that can be raised by means of the list.

Thus, in the column for goods and services it will immediately be seen that there is some discrepancy between what is offered in societies and what the needs are - and not only in the quantitative sense that too little is offered (and badly distributed), but in the qualitative sense that what is offered may sometimes be irrelevant, even counter-productive. Thus, the food available is not necessarily adequate as physiological input; medical treatment may not contribute to health; schooling not to education; transportation/communication only to restlessness and uprootedness rather than to the type of mobility that generates freedom, and so on. It may also be noticed that for some of the more ephemeral needs there is no built-in set of goods and services - which does not necessarily mean that these needs are left completely unattended to, but that the satisfaction is less institutionalized - for good or for bad.

Then, sometimes a _needs_ language is used, sometimes a _rights_ language. The reason for this is that the liberal tradition has led to the crystallization of human rights traditions - here seen as crystallized around the need for freedom - and that language is used in the table, for this is a rich and forceful tradition to draw upon. The point to be made, however, is that the rights also express needs, just as all the other needs could also be phrased as rights, as something that should be guaranteed by adequate social institutions. Thus, when the freedom to do politics is not guaranteed what suffers is not only "society" (whatever that may mean) but the concrete human beings living in the society: they become less than they could be, more apathetic, withdrawn into privatism,

Table 3: Basic needs, material and non-material

	Category	Needs and/or rights	Goods/Services
SECURITY	Security	Individual: against accident, homicide Collective: against attack, war	SECURITY
WELFARE	Physiological	Input: nutrition, air, water, sleep Output: movement, excretion	FOOD, WATER
	Ecological	Climatic: protection, privacy Somatic: protection against disease, health	CLOTHES, SHELTER, MEDICAL TREATMENT
	Socio-Cultural	Culture: self-expression, dialogue, education	SCHOOLING
FREEDOM	Mobility	(Right to travel, be travelled to (Rights of expression, impression	TRANSPORTATION COMMUNICATION
	Politics	(Rights of consciousness-formation (Rights of mobilization (Rights of confrontation	MEETINGS, MEDIA PARTIES ELECTIONS
	Legal	Rights of due process of law	COURTS, etc.
	Work	Right to work	JOBS
	Choice	(Right to choose occupation (Right to choose spouse (Right to choose place to live	
IDENTITY	Relation to self (individual needs)	(Need of self-expression, praxis, (creativity (Need for self-actuation, realizing (potentials syn- and diachronically (Need for well-being, happiness, joy (Need for sense of purpose; (a sense of meaning with life	HOBBIES, LEISURE LEISURE, VACATION VACATION RELIGION, IDEOLOGY
	Relation to others (collective needs)	(Need for affection, love, sex (spouse, offspring (Need for roots, belongingness, support, (association with similar humans	PRIMARY GROUPS SECONDARY GROUPS
	Relation to society (social needs)	(Need to be active, to be subject, (not passive, client, object (Need to understand what conditions (one's life, for social transparence ((Need for challenge, new experience - (also intellectual and aesthetic	
	Relation to nature	(Need for some kind of partnership (with nature	

less able to understand their own situation and
fight for other rights/needs. On the other hand,
each need on the list, and perhaps particularly
those in the first two categories, should also be
given the status as "rights" - they are in a sense .
even more important than those that are rights
because they are related to the material and so-
matic basis of human existence.

　　To what extent, then, can this now be used
to formulate some ideas about the good society?
If one looks at the list, both in the abbreviated
and in the specified form, it reads like a cata-
logue of demands put upon a good society - and as
such it is intended, only that there is the pre-
tense that this is not a random catalogue, but one
linked to the empirically testable notion of dis-
integration. In other words, the assumption is
that if these needs are not to some extent satis-
fied then individuals and/or societies will show
signs of disintegration - and since they are not
all satisfied for all, non-satisfaction does con-
stitute a basis for explaining much of the disin-
tegration found around the world. On the other hand,
if they are satisfied the result would be a society
where everybody enjoys a reasonable level of security -
knowing they have a very high probability of surviving,
of not being killed. They all enjoy the satisfaction
of basic material needs, giving a sense of well-being,
of welfare, in a simple, basically somatic sense;
but added to it in the sense that makes humans human
(and not merely well cared for organisms): being able
to communicate with others, and to express themselves.
Further, they are reasonably free, in the way liberal
societies have crystallized this concept - and they
enjoy identity with themselves, with others, with
society and with nature. Under this condition one
might say that the society is if not Utopian at least
developed, if development is to be understood as the
development of human beings. It could also be re-
ferred to as "peace", if peace is seen as human self-
realization - for what is self-realization except the
satisfaction of human needs - including the need to
be the subject of this need-satisfaction, not only
its object (like in a zoological garden)? Obviously,

in saying this we not only bring the concepts of
development and peace closer to human beings,
but also closer to each other - and that was
the purpose, together with the idea of providing
a language in which ideas about a better future may be articulated,
3. Needs and empirical studies.
To give more concreteness to this, let us
then try to answer the question: how is the
level of need-satisfaction, in other words of
development and peace, around the world? To ex-
plore this the world has to be divided into some
crude categories, and one way of doing that would
be to use the scheme "first world" (the capitalist,
rich countries), "second world" (the socialist
countries), "third world" (the capitalist, poor -
and dependent - countries) and the "fourth world":
China.

Here is one image of the situation:

Table 4.

An image of need-satisfaction around the world

	First World	Second World	Third World	Fourth World
	capitalist, rich	socialist	capitalist, poor	China
Security	+	+	-	+
Well-being	+	+	-	+
Freedom	+	-	-	-
Identity	-	-	+	+
Ecological Balance	-	-	+	+

(We have added "ecological balance to the list be-
cause it is so fundamental, although it cannot be
seen as a directly experienced human need - only
as a necessary condition).

Again, this is grossly over-simplified, but
probably also considerably more right than wrong as
an image. Thus, it would be hard to deny that China

is weak on mobility and choice of occupation and
place of work (under freedom); or that the social-
ist countries are weak on many aspects of freedom;
or that the rich capitalist countries and socialist
countries both suffer from alienation and ecological
imbalances (probably in both cases due to the struc-
tures induced by the industrial - rather than capi-
talist - mode of production); and that the third
world is the scene of most of the belligerent ac-
tivity, poverty and also of repression - whereas
structures generating a sense of identity have not
(yet) been completely destroyed by "modernization".

But the basic point in the diagram is as fol-
lows: given this image of what development and
peace are about, then no part of the world can
claim to be developed or peaceful; they are all
maldeveloped one way or the other or suffering
from peacelessness in one form or the other. It
is only by truncating the list of values to the
first three, the needs for security, welfare and
freedom, that the Western World is able to appoint
itself as developed - and also by neglecting the
experiences of China.

As a conclusion:

- in the first world the basic problem would be
  apathy/anomie, possibly even in the form of mental
  disease, because of alienation;

- in the second world the basic problem would be
  in the freedom/identity cluster, but in addi-
  tion sporadic - even large-scale - revolts due
  to repression;

- in the third world the basic problem would be
  people dying from violence and poverty, or suf-
  fering from diseases stemming from poverty;

- in the fourth world, China, sporadic revolts due
  to limited freedom.

In short: a world image that follows from the con-
siderations above - and hopefully not too untruthful
as an image of the contemporary world; indicating
how we are all mal-developed.

4. The conditions. So much for the four basic values,

with specifications - let us then turn to the
conditions - particularly the necessary condi-
tions. By that we mean conditions we feel have
to be satisfied for the needs to be satisfied.

Here is one way of grouping five such sets
of necessary conditions:

Table 5:

Values = Needs and necessary conditions.

PRODUCTION	Security	Welfare	STRUCTURAL TRANSFORMATION
DISTRIBUTION	Freedom	Identity	CULTURAL FACTORS

ECOLOGICAL
BALANCE

(A simplified scheme might talk in terms of economic,
social and environmental conditions.)

Obviously there has to be sufficient production
to satisfy the basic material needs, and it has to
be distributed in such a way that first priority is
given to the needs of those most in need.

In order to give stability to this need-satisfac-
tion (as opposed, for instance, to satisfying material
needs through technical assistance or donations (ca-
tastrophe aid)) a structure (local, domestic, global)
has to be built that is based on equity and autonomy,
and we shall identify that structure with self-reliance.
In all probability the culture also has to be of a
kind that at least does not directly contradict the
necessary conditions, e.g. by sanctioning production
for non-basic needs, seeing inequality and injustice
as inevitable, extolling centralizing, vertical
structures and proclaiming man as the master over
nature, entitled to destroy ecological imbalances.

And finally, the ecological balances as the
constraint nature places on the whole "exercise",
in order to avoid problems of resource depletion and
pollution - thereby ensuring a life not only in
solidarity with all human beings today, but also with
future generations - synchronic and diachronic
solidarity, in other words.

5. Conclusion

In the preceding three paragraphs we have tried to give some answers to the problem raised at the end of the introduction . In a sense these problems can now be formulated in a different way: do we in the needs-language have a sufficiently rich basis so that this language can serve as a common focus for the social scientists?

Obviously not: even a very superficial glance at any social science journal will show us that many problems are studied that are not formulated and cannot easily be formulated in this language. But that is not necessarily a very important objection since it may also be said that social scientists devote much of their time to the study of less important aspects of the human condition. Lest this answer should taste of ideological censorship, there is also a second type of answer: there is no claim that a need-language can be constructed that can serve as a substitute for all social science languages; the problem is whether it can serve as a focus, as some kind of common denominator for these languages.

And this seems to be a defendable position. Thus, there is no doubt from the preceding three paragraphs that in our efforts to explore some of the implications of a study of needs one has to touch on all social sciences at one point or the other, and not only human psychology. If human needs should become a focus for the social sciences, it would probably give more prominence to some kind of psychology or any other social science dealing with individual human beings, but any effort to explore the conditions for needs-satisfaction would immediately lead to excursions into the territories traditionally under the control of more macro-oriented social sciences. In other words, an orientation towards human needs will serve as a good basis for inter/trans-disciplinary research because that type of research will not become an administrative artefact only, but a necessity as soon as one starts persuing various types of needs and various types of conditions.

The traditional way out of the dilemma of keeping a needs-orientation while at the same time sticking to only one of the social sciences has been to curtail the list of needs. Thus, economists have limited their concerns to needs relating to welfare,

in other words to many of the material needs - and this has
permitted them to develop patterns of research into production,
distribution and to some extent structural transformation without
taking into consideration non-material needs for freedom and iden-
tity. Correspóndingly, those who, mainly within the traditions
of law and politology, explored how the needs for freedom can be
translated into human rights have tended to forget the economic
basis of these needs, and this has led to relatively empty insti-
tution-building around rights that may not have been the top con-
cerns for the majority of a very poor. population.

However, the major argument in favor of using needs as
a focus for the social sciences is that this would make it possible
to construct images of human beings that non-social scientists
will recognize. People think and act, they are motivated by their
suarch for security, welfare, freedom and identity, and they are
afraid of violence, poverty, repression and - usually without
knowing it - alienation. Consequently in the needs approach there
is at least a potential for a more humanized social science, not
only in the sense that it is about concrete human beings, but also
in the sense that it is for them (simply meaning that they can
fully understand the products of the social scientists if they
are written in a reasonable language - they speak to their con-
dition). In the future this type of humanization may also lead
to a social science more by non-social scientists, to more de-
professionalization of the social sciences.

This is on the list of positive . claims: what about
the counter-arguments? There are several of them, let us at least
mention some.

First, ir the introduction complaints were voiced about
fragmentation in the images of man, partialing human beings into
slices digestable to individual social scientists. But such lists
of needs as presented in Table 3 may also represent ways of dis-
secting human beings into small components. This is problematic,
and more holistic images of the human condition must be found in
addition to such lists that may be useful,but also dangerous because
specialists may grow up around each single items on such lists,
thereby loosing the possibility of more complete images.

Second, there is an important implication in everything
that has been said for the training of social scientists: he
and she should be a generalist having some understanding of the
total human condition, and - in addition to that - a specialist
in some types of needs and/or some types of conditions, possibly
anchored in one of the traditional disciplins.   This would turn
the social scientist into somebody less ridiculous and remote
from real life an real human beings than the social scientist
of yeater-year; the mono-disciplinary specialist. But a pluri-
disciplinary generalist is not necessarily less dangerous although
he and she may look more human.   In fact, they may become more
powerful because they command - superficially the old-time oldtime
specialist would say - a considerably bigger territory of insight
in the human condition.   On the other hand again: they will look
more like ordinary human beings and talk more like them - and hence,
presumably, be more controllable.

And we leave it at that: the rest is future, we have come
so far, not longer. In a sense we are back to base : what is the
meaning of being "human", what is the meaning of life, of self-
realization - what is the whole thing about? We may refer to
these problems in terms of needs, but basically they are the philo-
sophical problems humankind has always tried to come to grips with
and will always continue trying. So if the conclusion is that we
are today completing the journey, finding back to old mother philo-
sophy but hopefully after having gained some technical insight on
the way, so be it - that is all to the good.